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ABSTRACT
The Internet at the interdomain level is highly dynamic, as
autonomous networks change their connectivity to optimize
either monetary cost, profit and/or performance. Internet
Service Providers (ISPs), for example, are mainly concerned
with maximizing their profits, and they attempt to do so by
changing their set of providers or peers. It is not well un-
derstood, however, what the properties of the resulting in-
ternetwork are, in terms of topology, economics and perfor-
mance. In this paper, we propose ITER, a first-principles
model of interdomain network formation that incorporates
the effects of economics, interdomain traffic flow, geogra-
phy, pricing/cost structures and interdomain routing policies.
We use an agent-based compuational method (treating net-
works as selfish agents) to find the equilibrium that results
as each network uses a certain provider and peer selection
strategy (such as “peer by traffic ratios” or “peer by neces-
sity”). We study the properties of this equilibrium in terms
of topology, traffic flow and economics. We also investigate
the effect of factors such as the interdomain traffic matrix,
geography, and customer preferences on the properties of
the equilibrium network.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet at the interdomain level is a system of in-
teracting autonomous networks (ANs)1 that connect to each
other to provide end-to-end connectivity and access to vari-
ous forms of content. The “Internet ecosystem” is dynamic,
as ANs attempt to optimize, in a distributed manner, utility
functions such as monetary profit, cost or performance. The
utility that ANs are able to achieve depends both on “envi-
ronmental” factors (transit prices, peering costs or the pop-
ularity of new Internet applications) and on their choice of
providers and peers2. In practice, however, the process of
provider and peer selection is often treated as “black art”,
1ANs are similar to Autonomous Systems in BGP in the sense that
they are independently operated, except that they also include net-
works that do not have AS numbers.
2A “provider” is a network that provides transit, or access to the rest
of the Internet, to its customers. Two networks are “peers” if they
engage in settlement-free interconnection, whereby they provide
access to each other’s customers for free.
even by network operators of large ISPs. These ISPs select
their providers and peers using rules of thumb such as “peer
by traffic ratios” or “peer restrictively”. A systematic evalu-
ation of various provider/peer selection strategies is missing
from the literature.
The motivation behind this work was to create a frame-
work that can be used to study the effects of provider/peer
selection strategies used by different types of ANs. Note
that the goal is not to recommend which exact networks an
AN, i should choose as its providers or peers. That would re-
quire a precise knowledge of the strategy of every other AN,
the interdomain traffic matrix, and pricing/cost parameters.
Instead, the goal is to evaluate the effect of strategies such
as “AN i peers with any network with which it exchanges
roughly equal traffic”. In this case, the lack of precise in-
formation does not prevent us from gaining insights into the
effects of these strategies. We are interested in both local ef-
fects (how these strategies affect the ANs that use them), and
global effects (how they affect the overall Internet). Studying
the effects of provider and peer selection by ISPs is interest-
ing for several reasons. First, individual networks would like
to know which strategy would maximize their utility (either
monetary profits or performance). Second, we would like
to know the effects of these strategies on the global Inter-
net, in terms of topological structure, profitability of vari-
ous network types, and the risk of emerging monopolies or
oligopolies. Third, it is important for ANs to understand how
their provider/peer selection strategies perform under dif-
ferent conditions, such as diverse traffic characteristics and
application popularity, different pricing structures, or new
technology (e.g., inexpensive transmission capacity).
The main contribution of this paper is a model, ITER,
that provides the framework for answering questions of the
aforementioned type. ITER is based on first-principles, and
models the provider and peer selection process for differ-
ent classes of ANs – Enterprise Customers (EC), Small and
Large Transit Providers (STP and LTP), and Content Providers
(CP). ITER takes as input the interdomain traffic matrix,
routing policies, geographical constraints, and the economics
of transit, peering and local costs. ITER models the interde-
pendence between traffic flow, topology and the provider/peer

















Figure 1: The interdependence between topology, traffic
flow and per-AN fitness in the Internet ecosystem
domain traffic matrix, topology and routing policies deter-
mine the flow of traffic in the Internet. The traffic flow and
economic factors together determine the utility of each AN
(profit for transit providers and monetary cost/performance
for ECs). ANs optimize their utility by changing their set
of providers and peers, effectively changing the topology,
which in turn can affect the utility of other ANs. The ques-
tion we try to answer is, “Does this process to converge, and
if so, where?”, i.e., we are interested in “solving” the model
to find a state where no AN has the incentive to make fur-
ther changes to its connectivity (if such a state exists). As
ITER is intractable to solve analytically, we devise a method
to solve it computationally, using agent-based simulations.
We also study the existence and uniqueness of the resulting
equilibrium. We emphasize that ITER is not an evolution-
ary model; it does not model the long-term evolution of the
Internet ecosystem as ANs are born and die, application pop-
ularity changes and economic conditions fluctuate. Though
it is important to study the evolution of the Internet, we ar-
gue that for the purpose of evaluating provider/peer selection
strategies of ANs, the equilibrium of the static ITER model
can give valuable insights.
In this paper, we focus on a first practical application of
the ITER model, that of studying the properties of the equi-
librium internetwork, given different provider/peer selection
strategies used by ANs. In particular, we focus on two provider
selection strategies (choose cheapest providers, or choose
providers that are not competitors), and three peer selection
strategies (peer only when necessary to maintain reachabil-
ity, peer by traffic ratios, and peer when the potential ben-
efit of peering is larger than the estimated cost) for small
and large transit providers. We measure properties of the
resulting network in terms of topology (e.g., path lengths
and diameter), traffic flow, profitability of different types of
providers, and the number of providers that are profitable.
We also analyze the effect of factors such as the interdomain
traffic matrix, geography, and customer preference on the re-
sulting internetwork. Specifically, we investigate what hap-
pens when the interdomain traffic matrix consists of mostly
peer-to-peer (P2P) traffic, or if ANs at the edge of the In-
ternet choose their providers based on path lengths, or if
content providers replicate their content in all geographi-
cal regions. We envision several other applications of ITER,
discussed in Section 10, which we plan to pursue in future
work. We summarize the main findings in this paper:
• We find that if networks at the edge are price-conscious,
then LTPs can benefit by peering with CPs, and can
significantly harm the profitability of STPs; this comes
at the cost of longer end-to-end paths (Section 5).
• We find that the STP strategy of peering using “bal-
anced traffic ratios” is profitable only if they also use
price-based provider selection. In this case, STPs should
peer avoid peering with content providers. The choice
of the best peering strategy for STPs is heavily influ-
enced by their provider selection strategy (Section 5).
• We find that two conditions that are quite plausible in
the future Internet – an interdomain traffic matrix with
mostly P2P traffic , and content providers that repli-
cate their content in all regions – result in increased
profitability for STPs (Sections 6 and 8).
• We find that performance-aware provider selection by
edge networks results in a situation where end-to-end
paths are short and LTPs are profitable (Section 7).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the details of the ITER model. Section 3 describes
our approach for solving ITER using agent-based simula-
tions. In Section 4 we validate the model against some well-
known static and dynamic properties of the Internet. In Sec-
tion 5, we present results for the default model, which we
view as the current state of the Internet. In Section 6, we
evaluate a deviation of the default model with a predomi-
nantly P2P traffic matrix. We evaluate a deviation where
edge networks choose their providers based on performance
in Section 7, and a deviation where Content Providers repli-
cate their content in all geographical regions in Section 8.
We survey the related work in Section 9, and conclude in
Section 10 with a discussion of future applications of ITER.
2. MODEL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we summarize the key features of ITER3.
Table 1 lists all the acronyms and that will be used here and
in subsequent sections.
2.1 Network types
Enterprise Customers (EC): ECs are stub networks that
normally act as either mostly sources of traffic (e.g., web
hosting companies), or mostly sinks of traffic (e.g., cam-
pus, corporate or residential access networks). In ITER, ECs
3An earlier version of the ITER model was described in a 6-page
invited (not peer-reviewed) conference paper that we do not cite to






STP Small Transit Provider




PR Price-based provider selection
PF Performance-based provider selection
SEL Price-based Selective provider selection
NC Peering by necessity
TR Peering by traffic ratios
CB Peering by cost-benefit analysis
DF Default Model
P2P Deviation: P2P traffic matrix
EP Deviation: edge networks use
performance based provider selection
GEO Deviation: content providers
present in each geographical region
Table 1: Definitions of acronyms used
do peer and they do not have customers; their only action
is provider selection. We model a fraction of ECs as traf-
fic sinks (sink-ECs), while the remaining as traffic sources
(source-ECs).
Content providers (CP): CPs are also stub networks that
differ from ECs in two ways. First, they are sources of traffic
(e.g., Yahoo!, Google). Second, they can engage in peering
relations, following an “open peering” policy (peer with any
network that agrees to peer with them).
Small Transit Providers (STP) and Large Transit Providers
(LTP): Transit providers are networks whose main busi-
ness function is to provide Internet connectivity to their cus-
tomers. In ITER, transit providers do not act as sources or
sinks of traffic; they only carry traffic on behalf of other net-
works. Transit providers aim to maximize their profit and so
they select their providers and peers with this economic ob-
jective. Their peering policies are often described as “restric-
tive” or “selective”, in practice. STPs are transit providers
with limited geographical presence (e.g., Rogers Telecom or
China Telecom), while LTPs are transit providers with prac-
tically global presence (e.g., AT&T or Level3).
In the default ITER model, we simulate 180 ECs, 10 CPs,
16 STPs, and 4 LTPs. 20% of the ECs act as source-ECs,
while the rest are sink-ECs. This 210-node internetwork is
of course small compared to the real Internet (the number
of Autonomous Systems is about 30,000 today) to keep the
simulation time tractable; we will return to this scalability
issue in Section 3.
2.2 Traffic model
The traffic model concerns the generation of an inter-AN
traffic matrix. This matrix determines the amount of traffic
sent from each AN to every other AN. In ITER, we con-
sider two types of traffic: Client-Server (CS) traffic flows
from traffic sources, which are either CPs or source-ECs, to
sink-ECs (e.g., YouTube or RapidShare). Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
traffic flows between sink-ECs (e.g., BitTorrent). Without
showing the actual mathematical expressions, the key points
of the traffic model are the following. The total traffic vol-
ume (both CS and P2P) destined to each traffic sink is heavy-
tailed (Pareto distributed with shape parameter=1.1), i.e., few
sink-ECs are much larger traffic consumers than most other
sink-ECs. Traffic sources are ranked based on a popularity
index. CPs have higher popularity index than source-ECs.
The fraction of traffic from a given source to any sink-EC
follows a Zipf distribution (with exponent 0.8), determined
by the previous popularity ranking. The Zipf distribution
implies that few traffic sources, mostly CPs, are much heav-
ier traffic producers than most other sources. For simplicity,
we assume that the popularity of a source is the same for all
sink-ECs, ignoring any regional content preferences. A sim-
ilar popularity index for each sink-EC determines the distri-
bution of P2P traffic between sink-ECs. In the default ITER
model, 80% of the overall traffic is CS while the rest is P2P.
2.3 Geographical constraints
In ITER, each AN is geographically present in a certain
set of locations (e.g., exchange points or “GigaPoPs”). Two
ANs cannot establish a customer-provider or peering rela-
tion unless they are present in a common location. In the
default ITER model, 210 ANs are distributed in 5 locations.
ECs and CPs are present in one location, STPs in 2, and
LTPs in all 5 locations.
2.4 Routing and traffic flow
ITER captures the salient features of interdomain routing.
Specifically, traffic follows the “no-valley” policy, (traffic
from a provider cannot be sent to another provider, and traf-
fic from a peer cannot be sent to another peer), as well as the
“prefer-customer” policy (prefer a route that goes through a
customer; if not available, prefer a route that goes through
a peer; otherwise route through a provider). Whenever mul-
tiple preferred neighbors offer a route, choose the shortest
path; break ties deterministically based on the neighbor’s
AN number. It should be noted that calculating policy-compliant
shortest paths between all pairs of nodes is computationally
expensive (O(N3), where N is the number of ANs in the
internetwork). We have simplified the routing computation,
without violating the previous policies, with an algorithm
inspired by the method proposed by Gao and Wang [16].
We simplify the routing computation by assuming that stub
nodes do not form peering links. We can then calculate
the shortest policy compliant paths among providers. This
can be done efficiently in time O(NpEp), where Np is the
number of providers and Ep is the number of edges among
providers. Following this step, each provider p learns the
best path towards each stub s, via the provider p′ of s for
which p has the shortest path. This can be done in time
O(NpNsds), where dps is the multihoming degree of stubs.
Finally, each stub s determines the best path towards stub s′.
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To do this, s chooses the provider p from among its set of
providers that gives the shortest path towards s′. The final
step can be done in time O(N2s ds).
Given the inter-AN traffic matrix, the interdomain topol-
ogy and the routing model, we can then calculate the traffic
flow in the internetwork. The traffic flow determines the ag-
gregate amount of traffic that flows over each link and AN.
These per-link traffic loads are then used by the economic
model, described next.
2.5 Economic model
The economic component of ITER focuses on the profit of
transit providers. STPs and LTPs adjust their provider and
peering selections so that they maximize their profit. The
profit of a transit provider is calculated as the total revenue
from its customers, minus the transit fees to its providers (if
any), the peering costs (if any), and the local costs to main-
tain and operate its network. Let Ci be the set of customers,
Pi the set of providers and Ri the set of peers of a transit











Ti(v) represents the pricing function used by provider i for a
transit volume v (i.e., volume-based pricing). Ti(vic) gives
the transit payment made by customer c to provider i when
the aggregate traffic exchanged by the two networks is vic.
Tp(vpi) is the transit payment made by i to its provider p for
the traffic volume vpi. Ri(vir) is the cost of maintaining a
peering link between i and its peer r when the corresponding
traffic volume is vir. This fee is not paid by one peer to
the other; rather, it represents costs to setup (amortized over
time) or maintain that peering link. Li(vi) determines local
costs incurred by AN i (such as operations, staff, equipment)
when the aggregate traffic handled by i is vi.
In practice, transit prices show economies of scale mean-
ing that the per-bit cost of Internet transit decreases as the
volume of traffic increases. In ITER, we use concave in-
creasing functions for transit, peering and local cost func-
tions. Specifically, the pricing function of a transit provider
p for traffic volume v is given by
Tp(v) = mt,p ∗ v
et (1)
The exponent et controls the extent of the economies of
scale associated with the various costs; a lower value of the
exponent results in larger economies of scale. All transit
providers have the same exponent et but they differ in the
multipliers mt,p. This is consistent with pricing data we col-
lected from Norton [25] and Chang [10]. Similarly, peering
costs are calculated as:
Ri(vir) = mr,i ∗ v
er
ir (2)
while local costs also include a traffic-independent term li:
Li(vi) = li + ml,i ∗ v
el
i (3)
All transit providers are assigned the same exponents for
their peering and local cost functions, but they differ in the
multipliers mr,i, ml,i, and in the li term.
To the extent possible, we parameterized the economic
model using real-world data. Chang et al. [10] report that the
exponent for the transit pricing functions et is around 0.75,
while the peering exponent er is around 0.25. The transit
price multipliers mt,i of STPs vary between [30,140], while
those of LTPs vary between [80,150], i.e., LTPs tend to be
more expensive than STPs, but not always. These values are
based on data reported by Norton [25] in 2006. The peer-
ing cost multipliers mr,i vary in [300,400]. The local cost
exponent el is set to 0.5, while the local cost multipliers are
set differently for STPs and LTPs: [100,200] for STPs and
[300,400] for LTPs. The traffic-independent costs for LTPs
are greater than those for STPs; this reflects that LTPs have
larger networks, and hence larger operational costs. The lo-
cal cost parameters are assigned so that the traffic-dependent
and traffic-independent costs account for roughly equal frac-
tions. The transit, peering and local cost parameters are as-
signed so that, for the same traffic volume, peering costs are
the lowest, followed by traffic-dependent local costs, while
transit costs are the highest.
2.6 Provider selection methods
The interdomain topology is formed when each AN se-
lects its provider(s), and potentially its peers. In ITER, we
consider three provider selection methods and three peer se-
lection methods. Even though these methods are, to some
degree, abstractions of a wide diversity of service agree-
ments in the Internet, we believe that they capture the most
common practices.
Regarding provider selection, an AN i first determines the
set of candidate providers. These are transit providers (STPs
or LTPs) that have at least one region in common with i and
that are not in the customer tree of i. Then, i uses one of the
following three methods to select the final provider (or set of
providers, in case of multihoming):
Price-based (PR): The goal of i is to choose the cheapest
provider(s). The metric used for comparing providers is the
transit price multiplier mt,j associated with provider j.
Selective price-based (SEL): A transit provider i would
not want to select as provider a network that may become
its peer or customer in the future. In ITER, this implies that
an STP would not want to select another STP as provider,
and so it would choose only among LTPs. Similarly, an LTP
would not select an STP as provider, even if it is cheaper
than LTP candidate providers. Among the remaining candi-
dates, i would again select provider(s) based on price. SEL
is applicable only to STPs and LTPs.
Performance-based (PF): A network may select providers
based on the performance they offer. In ITER, we consider
a performance metric that is related to the weighted path
length from i to all sources and destinations of its traffic.
This method is applicable only to ECs and CPs, not to tran-
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sit providers (the latter would certainly not ignore pricing).
For each destination j of i, let Aij be the total traffic sent
and received by i to/from j. Let lkj be the path length from
provider k to destination j. The performance metric associ-






Multihoming, which refers to the practice of choosing mul-
tiple transit providers, is increasingly used, particularly by
transit providers [13]. In ITER, AN i is assigned a Maxi-
mum Multihoming Degree (MMD), i.e., a maximum number
of providers, depending on its type. This upper bound is typ-
ically determined by the desired redundancy level. In prac-
tice, it may not be possible to always find MMD candidate
providers. AN i ranks its set of candidate providers, based
on one of the previous three selection methods, and selects
up to MMD providers. In the default ITER model, we set the
MMD to 1 for ECs, 3 for CPs, 2 for STPs and 3 for LTPs.
2.8 Peer selection methods
For any AN, the objective for peering is to save transit
costs, by reducing the traffic volume that needs to be routed
through providers. Further, peering is required in some cases
to maintain reachability with the rest of the Internet. We
consider three peer selection methods, modeling the most
common approaches found in practice.
Peering by necessity (NC): With NC, networks i and j
peer only if that is necessary to maintain global reachability;
otherwise i will not be able to reach some of j’s customers
and vise versa. Neither AN can “force” the other to become
its customer. Also, in some cases i and j would choose each
other as provider based on their provider selection method.
When that is the case, they decide to peer instead.
Peering by traffic ratios (TR): A common approach for
peering is to rely on “traffic ratios”. Here, two ANs i and
j agree to peer if they exchange “roughly equal” volumes
of traffic. In practice, this is implemented by measuring the
ratio of the traffic that flows from i to j and from j to i. If this
ratio is close to one (within a factor of 2 in default ITER),
the two ANs agree to peer.
Peering by cost-benefit analysis (CB): Here, AN i as-
sesses both the costs associated with a given peering link and
the potential benefits that can be achieved by that link. The
costs associated with peering are due to the fixed and traffic-
dependent costs of establishing a peering link. The benefits
are due to reduced transit fees. AN i chooses to peer with j
if the estimated benefits are greater than the estimated costs.
In practice, i would need to estimate the “peerable traffic
volume” with network j to use CB.
2.9 Initialization
We construct the initial internetwork so that it matches
certain known properties of the Internet’s interdomain topol-
ogy. First, LTPs are assumed to be present in each geo-
graphical region and are fully-meshed with peering links.
This is similar to the well-known clique of Tier-1 Internet
providers. These are the only peering links in the initial
topology. Regarding the initial customer-provider links, a
recent study [13] measured the provider preference of dif-
ferent network types in the Internet and found that 60% of
the providers of ECs are STPs while 40% are LTPs. On the
other hand, approximately half of the providers of STPs and
CPs are STPs. So, we connect STPs to other STPs and LTPs
so that the number of links between STPs and LTPs is the
same with that between STPs and STPs. To connect ECs
and CPs, we follow a procedure that is similar to preferential
attachment. We add ECs and CPs sequentially, choosing a
provider (STP or LTP) with a probability that is proportional
to the existing customer degree of that provider.
We define a scenario as a specification of the provider
and peer selection strategies used by STPs and LTPs. In a
scenario, we assume that all providers belonging to the same
class follow the same strategy. For example, the notation
{DF, (SEL, TR), (SEL, NC)}
represents a scenario with the default ITER model (DF),
STPs use SEL provider selection and TR-peering, and LTPs
use SEL-provider selection and NC-peering.
3. SOLVING THE MODEL
Our goal is to to “solve” the model, determining the inter-
network that results as each AN changes its set of providers
and peers to optimize a certain utility function. ANs play
sequentially, and each AN i can observe how the actions of
previous ANs affect i’s traffic flow and economics.
3.1 AN actions
We present the steps used by an AN in each move.
1. Provider selection: First, an AN i identifies the set of
preferred providers, according to its provider selection cri-
teria. Let this set be Pi.
2. Try to peer with providers: If AN i does not engage in
peering, skip to step 3. Else, i tries to convert each of its
provider links to peering links. For this purpose, we eval-
uate the provider selection criteria of j, and find the set
Pj . If j ∈ Pi and i ∈ Pj , then i and j become peers “due
to necessity”. This condition captures the situation where
i and j cannot agree on who should be the provider of
whom. In this case, they need to peer to maintain global
reachability for their customers. AN i then removes tran-
sit links to providers that are also in the customer tree
of j. The intuition for this is as follows: When i and j
form a peering link, some providers from Pi may be in
the customer tree of j. i will never use such providers to
reach nodes in the customer tree of j, since the direct path
through the peering link is preferred. Figure 2 represents
a case where i can safely remove providers k and l after
forming a peering link with j. 4
4A corner case can occur when i needs providers to reach ANs that
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3. Check for potential peering candidates: AN i maintains
a list of possible peering candidates, Ri. As ECs do not
peer in our model, the set of peering candidates of i is re-
stricted to LTPs, STPs, and CPs that have a geographical
region in common with i. For each possible peering can-
didate k, i performs the following actions: If k is already
a peer of i, then i unilaterally verifies whether the peer-
ing requirements with i are satisfied. AN i also verifies if
it needs to peer with k due to necessity. If these peering
criteria are not satisfied, then i de-peers k and exits the
peering loop. If i and k are not peers, then i examines
whether it is possible to establish a new peering link with
k. This is a bilateral decision, and hence the peering cri-
teria of both i and k must be satisfied for a peering link
to be created. If the peering link is formed, then i again
executes the procedure for removing providers that are in
the customer tree of k (see step 2). If the peering link is
formed, i exits the peering loop. Note that in one move, i







Figure 2: AN i can remove providers k and l after form-
ing a peering link with provider j.
Note that all the actions performed by an AN in each move
are completely deterministic. This is in contrast to previ-
ous evolutionary models of Internet topology (such as those
based on preferential attachment [6]). Those models gen-
erate a random graph that has certain structural properties
such as a desired degree distribution. The ITER model is
not intended to be a topology generator. Instead, ITER mod-
els the optimizations performed by ANs, in terms of select-
ing providers and peers. These optimizations are essentially
deterministic in nature, as each AN attempts to unilaterally
maximize its utility function.
3.2 Computing equilibrium
Our goal is to “solve” the ITER model, computing an
equilibrium, given the initialization and the strategy of each
AN. An equilibrium, if it exists, is a situation where no AN
has the incentive to unilaterally change its set of providers or
peers. We solve ITER computationally, as it is too complex
are not in the customer tree of j, but all of i’s providers are also
in the customer tree of j. Rather than selecting arbitrarily which
provider to keep, we impose the condition that i keeps both k and
l.
to solve analytically. Solving ITER involves iteratively al-
lowing an AN to play (according to its pre-defined strategy
in each move), until we reach a stage where no AN has the
incentive to change its connectivity. This state is analogous
to the concept of Nash Equilibria (or pairwise stable equi-
libria when bilateral peering contracts are involved) in game
theoretic models. We assume that nodes play in a particular
sequence, with a randomly chosen starting node. We use the
following procedure to compute the equilibrium for ITER.
1. Pick the next AN i in the playing sequence.
2. Complete the move of AN i, as described in section 3.1.
3. If the move of AN i causes the topology to change,
recompute the routing tables, traffic flow and fitness
function of each AN.
4. Check termination criteria. If each AN has had a chance
to play and has not changed its connectivity, then stop.
An important issue is the time complexity involved in find-
ing an equilibrium using agent-based approach described above.
Figure 3 shows the simulation time 5 for the scenario {DF,
(SEL,TR), (SEL,NC)} as we increase the number of ANs,
keeping the relative proportions of different AN types fixed.
We find that the running time of the model scales super-
linearly with the number of ANs. The main reasons for this
are the complexity of computing the interdomain traffic flow,
and the number of iterations to reach equilibrium. As a re-
sult, it is computationally infeasible to run the model at a
scale larger than a few hundred ANs, particularly as we need
to run multiple simulations to investigate a wide parameter




























total number of networks
Figure 3: Simulation time to find an equilibrium vs. the
number of ANs.
3.3 Existence of equilibrium
An important question is whether the agent-based simula-
tion described in Section 3.2 is always able to find an equilib-
rium for ITER. We find empirically that in more than 95% of
5These simulations were run on a machine with with a 3GHz Intel
Xeon processor and 2GB of memory.
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the simulation instances, we are able to solve ITER to find an
an equilibrium. We find that 80% of the cases where we can-
not find an equilibrium occur when STPs use CB-peering. In
cases where we cannot find an equilibrium, the oscillation is
caused by a small number of ANs, and this oscillation is an
expected outcome of the interaction between provider and
peer selection, and traffic flow, and performance in the in-
ternetwork. Next, we present some cases where ITER does
not have an equilibrium, focusing on the fundamental rea-
sons behind the oscillations.
In figure 4(a), AN 25 (a content provider) is connected to
its preferred providers 1, 5 and 10, and the peering link with
12 does not exist. AN 25 uses its provider link to 10 to reach
ANs in the customer tree of 10. When 12 uses CB-peering,
it finds that peering with 25 leads to a higher fitness. This is
because 25 now uses the (free) peering link with 12 to reach
ANs in the customer tree of 10, due to which 12 earns rev-
enues from 10. After the peering link between 25 and 12 is
formed, 25 no longer needs 10 as a provider, and removes
the link to provider 10. When 25 removes the provider link
to 10, 12 no longer sees a benefit in peering with 25, and
de-peers 25. As the peering link betwen 12 and 25 is re-
moved, 25 is again able to choose its preferred providers,
which includes AN 10. The above sequence then repeats.
The fundamental factor that causes this oscillation is the in-
teraction between provider and peer selection. An AN that
creates a peering link with a provider does not need to retain
providers that are in the customer tree of peers.
In figure 4(b), AN 8 and 10 both use TR-peering. Content
stubs 110, 169 and 177 use PF provider selection, and are
initially not connected to 8. In this situation, the traffic ratio
between 8 and 10 is balanced, and 8 is able to peer with 10.
Due to this peering link, 8 obtains shortcut paths to nodes
in the customer tree of 10, and becomes more attractive for
content stubs 110,169 and 177 due to shorter weighted path
lengths. These content stubs connect to 8 as customers. This
affects the traffic flow between 8 and 10, whereby 8 sends
more traffic 10 on the peering link. When 10 evaluates the
peering link, it finds that the traffic ratios are no longer bal-
anced. This causes 10 to de-peer 8. Consequently, 8 loses
the advantage (attractiveness for performance-oriented cus-
tomers) from peering with 10, and the content stubs 110,
169 and 177 no longer prefer to connect to 8 as provider.
After the content stubs depart, the traffic ratio between 8 and
10 is again balanced, and 8 can peer with 10. The above
sequence then repeats. The fundamental reason for this os-
cillation is that the creation of a peering link between two
providers can improve (or harm) the weighted path lengths
that either provider can offer to customers. The peering cri-
terion (either traffic ratio or cost-benefit analysis) between
the two peers could now fail as customers are attracted (or
repelled) from this provider.
In a third example, the topology is as shown in figure 4(c).
STPs 9 and 10 both use CB-peering, and initially, the peering
links 9-10 and 10-19 are not present. Traffic from customers
of 10 to the common customers of 9 and 19 (such as C) ini-
tially follows the path 10-0-9-C. Using CB-peering, STP 10
adds 19 as a peer, as both see a benefit. Now traffic from
10 to C flows over the peering link between 10 and 19 (path
10-19-C). This causes traffic to shift away from 9, leading
to a loss of revenue. Using CB-analysis, STP 9 finds that
creating a peering link with 10 would serve to bring traffic
back to 9, leading to better fitness. Consequently, 9 and 10
form a peering link using CB-peering. Once the peering link
between 9 and 10 is formed, 10 does not see a benefit in
keeping the peering link to 19. After the link 10-19 is re-
moved, 9 finds that it would achieve better fitness without
the peering link with 10. Hence, 9 de-peers 10. The above
sequence then repeats. The underlying reason for this oscil-
lation is that the creation of a peering link alters the traffic
flow, affecting the profitability of other networks and leading
to the creation/removal of other peering links.
3.4 Uniqueness of equilibrium
An important issue is the uniqueness of the equilibrium
that results from solving ITER using the method described
in Section 3.2. We find that for a given initial topology and
set of AN strategies, the equilibria can depend on the order
in which ANs make their moves. In some cases ANs make
the “right move at the right time”, such as forming a par-
ticular peering link or choosing a certain provider, causing
different equilibria. The presence of multiple equilibria is
analogous to game theoretic models where the Nash equilib-
rium is not unique. To account for this uncertainty, we run
multiple simulations for a given initial topology and set of
strategies by changing the order of play for ANs. We then
study the expected value of the properties of the resulting
equilibrium network. For example, the expected fitness for
AN i is the fitness of AN i at equilibrium, averaged over a
number of permutations with different orders of play.
4. MODEL VALIDATION
A major problem with any model that aims to capture, not
only the interdomain topology, but also the economics and
the traffic flow in the Internet, is how to validate it. ISPs
are secretive about their economic and traffic data, while the
ground truth for the Internet topology remains elusive (espe-
cially for peering links) [11]. In this section, we present a
“best-effort” approach to validate ITER, comparing its pre-
dictions with known quantitative and qualitative characteris-
tics of the Internet. These characteristics span both static and
dynamic topological properties, as well as some basic facts
about Internet economics and distribution of traffic load. Clearly,
however, the following results cannot be viewed as a defini-
tive validation, given that other models may also be able to
reproduce the same properties.
The following results are based on the following scenar-
ios, {DF, (SEL,CB), (SEL,NC)}, {DF, (PR,TR), (SEL,NC)}
and {DF, (PR,CB), (SEL,NC)}, which we view as the most


















Figure 4: Examples of cases that lead to oscillations
differences between these three scenarios, in terms of the
following observations, are minimal.
Degree distribution: Figure 5 shows the complemen-
tary CDF (C-CDF) of the degree distribution for the sce-
nario {DF, (SEL,CB), (SEL,NC)} with 945 networks. Even
though it is not possible to be rigorous about the presence of
a power-law in such a small scale, it is clear that the degree
distribution is heavy-tailed. Of course this should not be sur-
prising. In the default ITER, we set the multihoming degree
of ECs and CPs to 1-3 providers, while STPs and LTPs can
attract many customers at their regions, and so few of them
will necessarily end up with large degrees. We also see the
presence of networks with intermediate degrees, indicating
that a single “attractor” network does not end up with all
other networks as its customers or peers.
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Figure 5: Degree distribution for an internetwork with
945 ANs {DF, SEL,CB), (SEL,NC)}.
Average path length: Another property of the Internet is
that the average path length, in terms of AS links, has re-
mained almost constant (at about 4 AS hops) during the last
decade [21, 13]. We have reproduced the same behavior in
ITER. Figure 6 shows the average path length in the network
for the scenario {DF, (SEL,CB), (SEL,NC)} as the number
of ANs is increased from 210 to 945. We find that the av-
erage path length between any two ANs remains close to 4
hops (with a variation range between 3 to 5 hops, which also
does not vary with the size of the internetwork).
Activity frequency: We next examine the dynamics as

























Total number of networks
Figure 6: Average path length as the number of ANs is
increased for scenario {DF, (SEL,CB), (SEL,NC)}.
To do so, we analyze the transient phase of the simulation,
before the internetwork converges. The activity frequency of
an AN is defined as the ratio of the number of times that
that AN changed its connectivity to the number of times
that AN “played”. A recent measurement study found that
ECs are the least active in changing their connectivity, while
providers (STPs, LTPs) and CPs are the most active [13].
The ITER simulations show the same qualitative trends: the
activity frequency of ECs is less than that for STPs, LTPs
and CPs, as shown in Figure 7. The higher activity fre-
quency for providers results in part from the interaction be-
tween provider and peer selection in these network types.
ECs do not peer, and they do not have a reason to change
their upstream providers as often as other network types.
Economic structure of transit market: We also exam-
ine the profitability of transit providers in the resulting ITER
internetwork. We find that a significant fraction of STPs and
LTPs fail to attract enough customers, and so they end up
with negative “profits”. In an evolutionary version of ITER,
these ANs would be removed as bankrupt or “dead”, similar
to what often happens in the real Internet. On the other hand,
there are several profitable STPs and LTPs, meaning that
the ITER internetwork does not converge to a monopoly or
oligopoly. This is in agreement with a recent measurement
study [13] which showed that the number of transit providers
that are active (meaning that they attract customers) is signif-















Figure 7: Activity frequency of each class of ANs for sce-
nario {DF, (SEL,CB), (SEL,NC)}.
ing towards a monopoly or oligopoly.
Distribution of link load: We also measure the traffic
volume carried by each link in the ITER internetwork. Fig-
ure 8 shows the C-CDF of the link loads on each interdomain
link for the scenario {DF, (PR,TR), (SEL,NC)}. Most links
carry small traffic loads; these are links mostly at ECs and
CPs at the edge of the Internet. On the other hand, there
are few links that carry very large traffic volumes; these are
customer-provider and peering links between transit providers.
Akella et al [2] observed a qualitatively similar phenomenon
in the Internet. They reported that links between transit providers
high in the hierarchy are typically of higher capacity than











Figure 8: C-CDF of traffic volume on each link for sce-
nario {DF, (PR,TR), (SEL,NC)}.
5. THE DEFAULT MODEL
In the rest of this paper, our goal is to understand the
impact of different provider/peer selection methods on the
topology, traffic flow, economics and performance of the re-
sulting internetwork. In this section, we focus on the Default
ITER model. In the following three sections, we consider a
number of deviations from the Default model, in terms of the
traffic matrix, the edge network provider preferences and the
geographical presence of CPs.
In the default ITER model, ECs use PR provider selec-
tion and they do not peer with other ANs. CPs also use PR
provider selection, but they peer using the CB method. For
STPs, as well as for LTPs, we consider two provider selec-
tion methods, PR and SEL, and three peer selection meth-
ods: NC, TR and CB. All ANs of the same type choose the
same provider and peer selection method. This agrees with
what we see in the Peering Database [1], for instance, where
networks of the same business function and size tend to use
the same type of peering policy.
An ITER scenario refers to the selection of a specific pair
of provider and peer selection methods for STPs and of an-
other such pair for LTPs. Since we have 6 provider/peer
combinations for STPs and 6 identical combinations for LTPs,
the total number of scenarios we need to consider is 36. Ta-
ble 2 shows the output metrics for each of these 36 scenarios
in the default ITER model. For each scenario, we run 20
ITER simulations. In each simulation, we use a different
random permutation of the sequence in which ANs move
during the ITER transient phase.
We measure several metrics that characterize the equilib-
rium network: The average path length between each pair
of ANs (unweighted as well as weighted by the traffic that
flows between those ANs), the aggregate fitness of STPs and
LTPs, the number of fit STPs and LTPs, the fraction of peer-
ing links and the fraction of total traffic that flows over peer-
ing links. The results in Table 2 are averaged over that subset
of the 20 runs in which ITER converged to a stable inter-
network. The standard error for each metric is also shown.
We compare various scenarios only when the corresponding
confidence intervals are non-overlapping.
5.1 Path Lengths
We report the weighted path length (column “wPL” in Ta-
ble 2) and the unweighted path length (column “uPL” in Ta-
ble 2) for each scenario of the Default model. Note that the
average path length in the resulting internetwork is close to
4 hops for all scenarios except when LTPs use CB; paths
tend to be longer when LTPs use CB-peering. In particu-
lar, the scenario {{DF, (PR,NC), (SEL,CB)} results in av-
erage path length of 4.2, compared to 3.9 in other scenar-
ios. When LTPs peer with CPs the traffic from CPs goes
through peering links to LTPs, and from there to ECs po-
tentially through one or more STPs. Figure 9 illustrates this
case for scenario {DF, (PR,NC), (SEL,CB)}. We see paths
of the following nature: LTPs peer with several CPs using
the CB method. The path from these CPs to destination
ECs (which are customers of say STP A) is of the form CP -
LTP -STPB-STPA-EC. If LTPs do not use CB, they will
not form peering links with CPs (TR peering would not work
because CPs always generate much more traffic than they
consume). The CPs would then probably choose STPs as
providers, as they tend to be less expensive than LTPs. This
leads to paths of the form CP -STPA-EC or CP -STPA-
STPB-EC that are shorter than the path observed when the
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sc STP LTP wPL uPL diam- profit profit profit profit num num num Traf %PP Traf
str str eter all STP all LTP fit STP fit LTP fit STP fit LTP UA UA PP
($k) ($k) ($k) ($k)
s1 PR,NC PR,NC 3.9 3.9 6.1 331 409 446 527 4.4 1.6 1.6 0.1 2.3 0.1
s2 PR,NC PR,TR 3.9 3.9 6.1 331 409 446 527 4.4 1.6 1.6 0.1 2.3 0.1
s3 PR,NC PR,CB 4.2 4.0 6.6 40 439 180 521 4.0 2.0 2.1 0.2 6.3 0.4
s4 PR,NC SEL,NC 3.9 3.9 6.1 355 368 465 495 4.8 1.5 1.4 0.0 2.9 0.1
s5 PR,NC SEL,TR 3.9 3.9 6.1 355 368 465 495 4.8 1.5 1.4 0.0 2.9 0.1
s6 PR,NC SEL,CB 4.2 4.0 6.6 39 441 179 523 3.9 2.0 2.2 0.2 6.3 0.4
s7 PR,TR PR,NC 3.9 3.9 6.2 335 393 451 504 4.5 1.7 1.6 0.0 2.5 0.1
s8 PR,TR PR,TR 3.9 3.9 5.9 317 426 433 544 4.2 1.6 1.6 0.0 2.2 0.2
s9 PR,TR PR,CB 4.1 3.9 6.3 55 458 200 545 3.0 2.1 1.9 0.2 6.0 0.5
s10 PR,TR SEL,NC 3.9 3.9 6.2 347 369 459 491 4.9 1.5 1.4 0.0 3.0 0.1
s11 PR,TR SEL,TR 3.9 3.9 6.0 301 431 416 546 4.3 1.7 1.4 0.0 3.1 0.2
s12 PR,TR SEL,CB 4.1 3.9 6.3 24 480 173 554 3.1 2.2 2.0 0.2 6.7 0.4
s13 PR,CB PR,NC 3.9 3.9 6.0 333 392 445 502 4.5 1.7 1.5 0.0 3.3 0.2
s14 PR,CB PR,TR 3.9 3.9 5.8 229 498 344 602 4.1 1.9 1.0 0.0 3.4 0.2
s15 PR,CB PR,CB 3.9 3.9 6.0 63 472 209 538 2.5 2.5 1.4 0.2 7.4 0.5
s16 PR,CB SEL,NC 3.9 3.9 6.0 243 471 352 576 4.6 1.9 1.3 0.0 4.0 0.2
s17 PR,CB SEL,TR 3.9 3.9 5.9 226 501 340 605 4.2 1.9 1.0 0.0 3.9 0.2
s18 PR,CB SEL,CB 3.9 3.9 5.9 33 492 183 551 2.4 2.5 1.7 0.1 8.4 0.5
s19 SEL,NC PR,NC 3.9 3.9 5.0 -48 851 92 951 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 2.1 0.0
s20 SEL,NC PR,TR 3.9 3.9 5.0 -48 851 92 951 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 2.1 0.0
s21 SEL,NC PR,CB 4.0 3.9 5.0 -185 787 2 873 1.0 2.0 3.0 0.5 5.9 0.3
s22 SEL,NC SEL,NC 3.9 3.9 5.0 -48 851 92 951 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 2.1 0.0
s23 SEL,NC SEL,TR 3.9 3.9 5.0 -48 851 92 951 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 2.1 0.0
s24 SEL,NC SEL,CB 4.0 3.9 5.0 -185 787 2 873 1.0 2.0 3.0 0.5 5.9 0.3
s25 SEL,TR PR,NC 3.9 3.9 5.0 -48 851 92 951 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 2.1 0.0
s26 SEL,TR PR,TR 3.9 3.9 5.0 -6 799 134 899 2.9 2.0 1.1 0.0 2.0 0.1
s27 SEL,TR PR,CB 3.9 3.9 5.0 -104 701 83 772 1.2 2.3 2.5 0.4 5.7 0.4
s28 SEL,TR SEL,NC 3.9 3.9 5.0 -48 851 92 951 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 2.1 0.0
s29 SEL,TR SEL,TR 3.9 3.9 5.0 -10 806 129 906 3.0 2.0 0.9 0.0 2.3 0.1
s30 SEL,TR SEL,CB 3.9 3.9 5.0 -110 709 76 782 1.0 2.3 2.7 0.5 6.1 0.4
s31 SEL,CB PR,NC 3.8 3.9 5.0 65 734 182 834 4.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 3.6 0.1
s32 SEL,CB PR,TR 3.8 3.9 5.0 113 680 233 776 3.7 2.0 1.3 0.0 3.1 0.2
s33 SEL,CB PR,CB 3.9 3.9 5.0 -40 597 122 653 2.0 2.7 1.4 0.2 6.2 0.5
s34 SEL,CB SEL,NC 3.8 3.9 5.0 65 734 182 834 4.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 3.6 0.1
s35 SEL,CB SEL,TR 3.8 3.9 5.0 115 680 231 780 3.8 2.0 1.3 0.0 3.7 0.2
s36 SEL,CB SEL,CB 3.9 3.9 5.0 -46 622 115 687 2.0 2.4 1.6 0.2 6.7 0.5
standard error 0.02 0.01 0.07 24 29 23 28 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.13 0.02
Table 2: Default model, DF
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LTP peers with CPs. Also, these longer paths are from the
major sources of traffic (CPs) to their destinations (ECs). So,
the weighted path length (4.2) is longer than the unweighted
path length (4.0).
5.2 Peering links
As expected, we see that there is a positive correlation be-
tween the percentage of peering links (“%PP”) and the frac-
tion of the total traffic flow that traverses at least one peering
link (“Traf-PP”). Both of these metrics are maximized when
STPs and LTPs both use CB-peering. In those scenarios, 6-
8% of all links are PP links, and 50% of the total end-to-end
traffic flows over those links. In those scenarios, both STPs
and LTPs are able to peer with CPs. The large traffic volume
from CPs to ECs now flows through those peering links.
5.3 “Unprofitable-but-Active” (UA) providers
We evaluate a metric that measures the long-term eco-
nomic stability of the resulting internetwork. Some transit
providers attract customers due to either lower prices or bet-
ter performance, but are not profitable because their local
and transit costs are higher than their revenues. Such an eco-
nomic situation would not be sustainable in the long-term, as
these providers would either go bankrupt or they would have
to increase their prices. We measure the number of providers
that are Unprofitable-but-Active (“num UA” in Table 2). We
also measure the maximum traffic volume (as a fraction of
the total traffic flow) carried by UA transit providers (“Traf
UA”). First, note that the two metrics are positively corre-
lated: a larger number of UA providers results in a larger
traffic volume handled by UA providers. Second, we have
more UA providers when LTPs peer with CPs (see, for exam-
ple, scenario {DF, (PR,NC), (SEL,CB)}). In that scenario,
traffic from CPs to ECs flows through a hierarchy of STPs.
STPs at the top of the hierarchy can become UA providers,
as they pay large transit fees to the generally more expen-
sive LTPs. The largest number of UA providers results when
STPs use SEL provider selection and peer using either NC
or TR (up to 3 UA providers, and 50% of the total traffic car-
ried by those providers). Then, STPs cannot peer with CPs
and they also choose only LTPs as providers. All traffic from
CPs to ECs flows through customer-provider links between
STPs and LTPs, and this creates even more UA STPs.
5.4 Provider profitability when STPs use PR:
LTPs can harm STP profitability by peering with CPs:
When most edge networks choose providers based on price,
cheaper STPs are able to attract a large fraction of the edge
networks. Due to the overlapping prices of STPs and LTPs,
however, LTPs can also attract some edge networks as cus-
tomers. When STPs use PR provider selection, a hierarchy
of STPs is formed. When LTPs use PR as well, they may be
forced to connect to STP providers, and the peering clique
of LTPs may no longer be sustainable. In such situations,
both STPs and LTPs see approximately equal aggregate fit-
ness. LTPs can, however, significantly harm the aggregate
profits of STPs by using CB-peering, which allows them to
peer with CPs. In this case some LTPs are able to form a
large number of peering links with CPs. Consequently, these
CPs reach most of their destinations through peering links
with LTPs, followed by a hierarchy of STPs. In the default
model, CPs source a large fraction of the traffic that goes to
ECs. Consequently, the LTPs can significantly reduce the fit-
ness of STPs by engaging in CB-peering. The conventional
wisdom for LTPs is to only peer with other LTPs. This re-
sult shows that CB-peering by LTPs can lead to a situation
where LTPs significantly reduce STP profits, and are able to
















Figure 9: Peering between LTPs and CPs increases LTP
profitability, but also increases weighted path lengths.
The arrows indicate the paths followed by large traffic
flows.
STPs should use TR-peering:
We find that the best peering strategy for STPs depends on
the peering method used by LTPs. First consider the case
where LTPs do not peer with CPs. In this scenario, we
find that STPs achieve higher aggregate fitness by using TR-
peering (though the total number of fit STPs is smaller). For
example, the aggregate STP fitness in scenario {DF, (PR,TR),
(PR,TR)} is $317k, while it is $229k in scenario {DF, (PR,CB),
(PR,TR)}. This indicates that the conventional wisdom of
TR-peering results in higher STP fitness, when STPs use
price-based provider selection. The reason for this is as fol-
lows. If STPs use CB-peering, then some CPs become their
peers. On the other hand, if STPs use TR-peering, they can-
not peer with CPs, as CPs always generate more traffic than
they consume. These CPs would eventually become cus-
tomers of STPs, as most edge networks choose providers
based on price. This increases the fitness of STPs. On the
other hand, when STPs use CB-peering, they can peer with
CPs. In this case the traffic flow is of the form CP-STP-EC;
less traffic flows on the customer-provider links in the hier-
archy of STPs, leading to lower aggregate fitness for STPs.
Next, consider the case where LTPs use CB-peering. In
this case, STPs are more profitable by using CB-peering than
with TR-peering. If CPs peer with LTPs, then they do not
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need to choose STPs as providers. Given that these CPs will
not become their customers, STPs can improve their prof-
itability by peering with them. This can happen only if STPs
use CB-peering.
5.5 Provider profitability when STPs use SEL
STP fitness is determined by LTP prices:
In this scenario, STPs do not choose other STPs as providers,
because they consider them as potential peers or competi-
tors. STPs still attract the price-conscious ECs and CPs. All
STPs connect directly to LTPs due to SEL provider selec-
tion. This results in higher fitness for LTPs than the sce-
narios where STPs use PR provider selection. In case STPs
peer only by necessity, the aggregate STP fitness can be neg-
ative, and there are no fit STPs. As these STPs carry traf-
fic to/from their customers, we see a larger number of UA
providers, and a larger fraction of traffic flowing through
such providers. The aggregate fitness of STPs depends on
the relative prices of STPs and LTPs. In our simulation
setting, LTP prices are slightly higher than those of STPs,
leading to a situation where STPs pay more in transit prices
than they can recover from their customers. If LTP and STP
prices are comparable, the aggregate STP profit can still be
positive. The key point is that if STPs use SEL provider se-
lection, LTPs are in a position to use their market power
to charge higher prices, and potentially make STPs unprof-
itable.
STPs should use CB-peering:
When STPs use SEL provider selection, they achieve higher
profits using CB-peering than TR-peering (e.g., the aggre-
gate STP profit is $65k in scenario {DF, (SEL,CB), (PR,NC)},
while it is $-48k in {DF, (SEL,TR), (PR,NC)}). This is
in contrast to the case where STPs use PR provider selec-
tion, where they are better off using TR-peering. The reason
for this is as follows. When STPs use SEL provider selec-
tion, they only connect to LTPs. Due to the higher prices
of LTPs, it is beneficial for STPs to send as little traffic as
possible to their upstream providers. If an STP S peers with
a CP C, S only carries traffic destined from C to ECs in
the customer tree of S. S does not send any of this traffic
to its providers, and this traffic is profit-generating. This
allows the STP to remain profitable even if LTPs charge
high transit prices. A further benefit of CB-peering is that
it allows “content-heavy” and “access-heavy” STPs to peer.
Content-heavy STPs have many CPs as customers, while
access-heavy STPs have many ECs as customers. These two
types of STPs can peer only with CB-peering (traffic ratios
will always be unbalanced), and results in increased fitness
for STPs. This makes the case that content and access heavy
STPs should peer with each other to be profitable.
6. DEVIATION-1: P2P TRAFFIC MATRIX
In the default model, the interdomain traffic matrix con-
sists mostly of CS traffic (80%). In this section, we consider
a deviation where the traffic matrix consists mostly (80%) of
P2P traffic. Edge networks still choose their providers using
PR, as in the default model. We call this deviation “P2P”.
The tables with the detailed results for P2P and subsequent
deviations are in the appendix.
Peer-to-peer traffic helps STPs:
In the default model, most edge networks choose providers
based on price. In Section 5, we observed that LTPs can
significantly diminish the aggregate profit of STPs by us-
ing CB-peering. When the traffic matrix consists mostly of
P2P traffic, the traffic volume from CPs to ECs is relatively
smaller. As a result, the benefit for LTPs from peering with
CPs is lower. The aggregate fitness of STPs is $187k with
scenario {P2P, (PR,NC), (PR,CB)}, while it is $40k for the
scenario {DF, (PR,NC), (PR,CB)}. A traffic matrix that con-
sists of mostly P2P traffic thus benefits STPs.
Smaller increase in weighted path lengths when LTPs
peer with CPs:
In the default model, we observed that when LTPs peer with
CPs, weighted path lengths are longer than unweighted path
lengths. For example, the weighted path length is 4.2 in
scenario {DF, (PR,NC), (PR,CB)}, while the unweighted
path length is 4.0. For scenario {P2P, (PR,NC), (PR,CB)}
the weighted path length is 4.1, while the unweighted path
length is 4.0, i.e., we observe a similar phenomenon with
the P2P traffic matrix, though the difference between the
weighted and unweighted path lengths is smaller. When
the traffic matrix is predominantly P2P, the volume of traffic
flowing from CPs to ECs (over the long paths caused when
LTPs peer with CPs) is smaller than in the default model.
TR-peering is more profitable for STPs:
In the default model, when STPs use SEL provider selection,
we found that either NC or TR-peering led to negative aggre-
gate STP fitness (e.g., aggregate STP profit is $-104k in {DF,
(SEL,TR), (PR,CB)}). This is because the traffic matrix has
mostly CS traffic, and only a small fraction of the traffic
flows between ECs (which are customers of STPs). Con-
sequently, peering by STPs does not give significant benefit.
With the P2P traffic matrix, however, a larger fraction of the
end-to-end traffic flows between ECs. STPs can save sig-
nificant transit fees if they use TR-peering (aggregate STP
profit is $58k in {P2P, (SEL,TR), (PR,CB)}). The likelihood
of STPs being able to peer using TR-peering depends also
on the peering strategy of LTPs; in particular, whether LTPs
peer with CPs. We illustrate this with a specific example in
Figure 10. In subfigure (a), the LTP peers with CPs. The
traffic between STP A and STP B is now balanced, allow-
ing them to peer using TR-peering. Subfigure (b) shows the
case where LTPs do not peer with CPs. These CPs become
customers of STPs, which are cheaper than LTPs. This can
lead to the emergence of “content-heavy” STPs (STPs with
content customers) and “access-heavy” STPs (STPs with ac-
cess customers). Content and access heavy STPs cannot peer
with each other using TR-peering, as the traffic is always im-
balanced (more traffic from CPs to ECs). Thus, if the traffic
matrix consists of mostly P2P traffic, then STPs can save
12
significant transit costs with TR-peering. Further, peering
between LTPs and CPs favors STPs, as it results in more
balanced traffic between STPs, giving them more opportuni-
ties to peer.
Traffic flow over UA providers:
In the P2P model, the traffic flow through UA providers is
reduced, particularly when STPs use PR provider selection.
In the default model, if LTPs peer with CPs, a number of
STPs become unprofitable. As stated earlier, P2P traffic
helps STPs, and the ability of LTPs to decrease aggregate
STP fitness is reduced. This leads to a smaller number of
STPs that are “unprofitable but active”. In particular, for
scenario {DF, (PR,NC), (PR,CB)}, 20% of the end-to-end
traffic flows over UA providers, while for scenario {P2P,
(PR,NC), (PR,CB)}, this value is around 4%.
An exception to the above result is when STPs use (SEL,NC).
In this case, STPs connect directly to LTPs, and do not peer
with other STPs. With P2P traffic, a large amount of traffic
flows from ECs to other ECs. When STPs use SEL provider
selection, this traffic traverses the customer-provider links
from STPs to LTPs. This results in a larger number of UA
providers and a larger fraction of traffic handled by those UA
providers; 30% of the total traffic flows over UA providers
in {P2P, (SEL,NC), (PR,NC)}, while that number is close to
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Figure 10: Peering between STPs more likely with P2P
traffic and especially when LTPs peer with CPs. The ar-
rows indicate the paths followed by large traffic flows.
7. DEVIATION-2: PF PROVIDER SELEC-
TION BY EDGE NETWORKS
In the default model, 80% of ECs and CPs use PR provider
selection. In this section, we consider a deviation where 80%
of edge networks choose their providers using the PF method
described in Section 2.6. We call this deviation “EP”. The
interdomain traffic matrix still consists of mostly (80%) CS
traffic, as in the default model.
PF provider selection favors LTPs:
ECs and CPs that use PF provider selection are attracted to
LTPs, and eventually, most ECs and CPs connect directly to
LTPs. This is because LTPs can reach all destinations us-
ing links to their customers or peers, and so they provide
the shortest paths. STPs can only attract the few ECs and
CPs that use PR-provider selection. When STPs use SEL
provider selection, there are no fit STPs (aggregate STP fit-
ness is negative). Further, when STPs use SEL, no form
of peering leads to positive aggregate fitness. In the default
model, when STPs use SEL, they can be profitable by CB-
peering. In the default model, STPs have a large customer
base of ECs and CPs, and peering with CPs (or “content-
heavy” STPs) can save significant transit expenses. In the EP
model, however, STPs have a significantly smaller customer
base. Consequently, peering does not increase the aggregate
fitness of STPs.
Shorter paths:
When ECs and CPs use PF provider selection, the average
path lengths in the network decrease. This is because net-
works at the edge are attracted to LTPs. End-to-end paths are
of the form EC-LTP-EC or EC-LTP-LTP-EC, with no inter-
mediate STPs. This results in shorter end-to-end paths. The
unweighted path length is 3.3 for scenario {EP, (SEL,NC),
(PR,NC)}, as opposed to 3.9 for scenario {DF, (SEL,NC),
(PR,NC)}. This implies that the EP model leads to a sit-
uation that is beneficial for the performance seen by edge
networks, at the expense of STP profitability.
Weighted paths shorter than unweighted paths:
In scenarios where STPs use (PR,NC), the weighted path
lengths are smaller than the corresponding unweighted path
lengths. For example, the weighted path length for scenario
{EP, (PR,NC), (PR,NC)} is 3.3, while the unweighted path
length is 3.5. This can be explained as follows: Networks at
the edge (ECs and CPs) choose providers based on perfor-
mance, and are thus attracted to LTPs. STPs, on the other
hand, use PR provider selection and connect to other STPs.
This creates a hierarchy of STPs, but with a very small cus-
tomer base connected to STPs. Consequently, we see paths
that traverse the hierarchy of STPs and LTPs, but only a
small fraction of the total traffic flows on those paths. Most
of the traffic flows on the short paths of the form EC-LTP-
EC. As a result, the weighted path length is smaller than the
corresponding unweighted path length.
More traffic over UA providers:
In the default model, significant traffic is carried by UA providers
when STPs use PR provider selection and LTPs peer with
CPs, e.g., 20% of the total end-to-end traffic is carried by
UA providers in scenario {DF, (PR,TR), (PR,CB)}. In other
scenarios of the default model, negligible traffic is carried
by UA providers. In the EP model, however, 10-20% of
the total traffic is carried by UA providers in each scenario.
The reason for this is as follows. When edge networks use
PF-provider selection, only a few ECs and CPs connect to
STPs. Most of the traffic sourced/consumed by these cus-
tomers of STPs comes from CPs and ECs that are connected
to LTPs. Consequently, STPs send/receive large traffic vol-
umes to their LTP providers, which leads to a larger number
13
of STPs that are unprofitable.
8. DEVIATION-3: CPS REPLICATE THEIR
CONTENT IN EVERY REGION
In the default model, each CP is present in a single geo-
graphical region. A recent trend in the Internet is that CPs
increasingly expand their geographical presence [17], either
through the use of content distribution networks (CDNs), or
by replicating their content at multiple locations. We present
a deviation of the default model where CPs are present in
every geographical region. Geographical expansion by CPs
allows them to peer with networks in a larger number of re-
gions, and also them to select providers from a larger number
of regions. We call this deviation “GEO”.
Larger STP profits:
In GEO, STPs obtain larger as compared to the default model.
In GEO, most CPs use PR provider selection, but they are
not restricted to choosing the cheapest provider from a sin-
gle region. Instead, they can choose the cheapest (which are
typically STPs) across all regions. This results in larger ag-
gregate profits for STPs. For example, the aggregate STP fit-
ness is $331k with scenario {DF, (PR,NC), (PR,NC)}, while
it is $450k in scenario {GEO, (PR,NC), (PR,NC}.
STPs can be profitable even with SEL provider selection:
In the default model, we observed that if STPs use SEL, then
the aggregate STP profits depend on the relative prices of
STPs and LTPs. In the default model, STPs are unprofitable
with SEL provider selection, unless they use CB-peering. In
the GEO model, however, we find that STPs can be prof-
itable even if they use SEL provider selection and NC or
TR-peering. This is because most CPs use PR provider se-
lection, and can select the cheapest STPs from all regions.
This increases the aggregate profits of STPs.
Larger aggregate profit for STPs by TR-peering:
In the default model, when STPs use PR provider selection,
their aggregate profit is larger with TR-peering than with
CB-peering. This is because by using CB-peering, STPs
peer with CPs, which would otherwise become their cus-
tomers. We find that this effect is more pronounced when
CPs are present in every region. The difference between sce-
narios {DF, (PR,TR), (PR,TR)} and {DF, (PR,CB), (PR,TR)}
is $88k (38%), while the difference between {GEO, (PR,TR),
(PR,TR)} and {GEO, (PR,CB), (PR,TR)} is $151k (45%).
Shorter paths:
As in the EP model, we find that several scenarios in GEO
lead to weighted paths that are shorter than unweighted paths.
For example, the weighted path length for scenario {GEO,
(PR,NC), (PR,NC)} is 3.7, while the unweighted path length
is 3.9. In GEO, the traffic matrix has mostly CS traffic, with
large traffic volumes from from CPs to ECs. Further, CPs
can connect to STPs in multiple regions, and the number of
CP-STP links is larger than in the default model. Conse-
quently, we see a large number of “short” paths of the form
CP-STP-EC, which bypass LTPs and also carry significant
traffic. This leads to weighted paths that are shorter than
unweighted paths.
9. RELATED WORK
A major research effort aimed to characterize the AS-level
topology during the last decade. One of the most well cited
papers, by Faloutsos et al. [15], argued that the Internet AS-
level topology is “scale-free”. The observation that the de-
gree distribution follows a power-law led to several topol-
ogy generation models that could produce such distributions,
starting with the preferential attachment model of Barabasi
et al. [6]. Several variants and comparisons of preferential
attachment models were later proposed [3, 7, 26, 28, 29,
30, 31] The models in this research thread have been mostly
descriptive, meaning that they attempt to reproduce certain
known structural characteristics of the Internet.
The previous descriptive models received considerable crit-
icism (for instance, see [19, 20]) because they mostly focus
on the degree distribution and clustering, ignoring important
characteristics of the Internet topology such as hierarchy or
the presence of links of different types (transit versus peer-
ing). Further, those models do not explain how the Internet
topology is evolving. This led to models that view the In-
ternet topology as the effect of optimization-driven activity
by individual ASes. These concepts were first introduced by
Carlson and Doyle in [8], and later applied in the context of
the Internet in [14]. Chang et al. [9] model AS interconnec-
tion practices, considering the effects of AS geography, AS
business models and AS evolution.
The body of work closest in spirit to ours is that of Chang
et al. [10]. That work focused on developing a model for the
provider and peer selection behavior of ASes, taking into
account the economics of transit and peering relationships
and practical constraints such as geography. In this work,
we focus mainly on studying the properties of the equilib-
rium that results as each AS uses certain provider and peer
selection strategies. Also related is the work of Holme et
al. [18], which developed an agent-based simulation model
where the agents are individual ASes with economic incen-
tives. Their model captures the effects of economics, geog-
raphy, user population and traffic flow in AS interconnec-
tion. They do not, however, model the presence of different
classes of ASes with different incentives and business func-
tions, and their model is rather simplistic, ignoring some im-
portant domain-specific details about the Internet at the in-
terdomain level. Corbo et al. [12] propose an economically-
principled model that is able to create the observed structure
of the AS graph. The goal of their work is mainly to derive,
from first principles, a model that reproduces certain charac-
teristics of the AS graph.
A series of papers [22, 23, 24] advocate the use of the
Shapley value for revenue distribution between ISPs. They
show that if profits are shared according to the Shapley value,
the set of “fair” properties inherent to the Shapley solution
exist, and the selfish behavior of ISPs leads to globally opti-
mal routing and interconnection decisions. A body of work
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known as “network formation games” [4, 5, 27] takes a game
theoretic approach to the creation of interdomain links be-
tween autonomous networks. These papers formulate a game
where Autonomous Systems form a graph to route traffic be-
tween themselves. Variants of these models assign costs for
routing traffic, as well as for a lack of end-to-end connec-
tivity. The goal of each AS is to create the set of links that
maximizes its utility. A key difference of these models with
ours is that they are static in nature; they model one-shot
games where an AS knows the payoff obtained from creat-
ing a particular link. We consider the realistic case where
ASes do not play simultaneously, and are able to observe the
moves made by previous players. Also, we assume that an
AS cannot predict the payoffs it would obtain by choosing
certain providers or peers.
10. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed ITER, a detailed model of in-
terdomain network formation that captures the interdepen-
dence between interdomain topology, traffic flow and provider
and peer selection strategies of ANs. We present an ap-
proach to solve this model using agent-based simulations.
As a first practical application of this model, we evaluate the
effect of various strategies for provider selection (“choose
cheapest providers”, “choose higher-tier providers”) and peer
selection (“peer by necessity”, “peer by traffic ratios” and
“peer by cost-benefit analysis”) on the profitability of small
and large transit providers. We examine the effects of these
strategies on the economics, topology and performance of
the internetwork at equilibrium. There are several other ap-
plications of ITER, which we plan to pursue in future work:
1. In future work, we will use ITER to find the optimal strat-
egy for each class of ANs, i.e., the strategy that max-
imizes their profitability given the expected strategy of
other ANs.
2. In this paper, we focused on ITER scenarios where each
class of ANs uses the same strategies for provider/peer
selection. In future work, we plan to examine scenarios
where each AN can use a different strategy.
3. An important aspect of ITER is that the selection of providers
is partly based on their prices. To study a basic framework
for pricing decisions, we propose to extend ITER to the
following extended model. Before the network formation
stage, each transit provider decides its price. In the sec-
ond stage, we solve ITER for this setting of prices. Using
the equilibria resulting from the second stage, we can de-
termine the equilibrium pricing strategies (first stage) so
that each provider maximizes its own profit. We propose
to extend ITER to include strategic pricing, allowing us to
observe the dynamics of the joint process between pricing
and network formation.
4. Each AN in the Internet tries to optimize its own util-
ity function in a distributed manner. An important open
question is “What problem does the Internet, at the global
level, try to solve through such distributed optimizations?”
In future work, we will attempt to answer this question by
comparing the equilibrium that results from ITER with
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APPENDIX
Detailed results for deviations P2P, EP and GEO
16
sc STP LTP wPL uPL diam- profit profit profit profit num num num Traf %PP Traf
str str eter all STP all LTP fit STP fit LTP fit STP fit LTP UA UA PP
($k) ($k) ($k) ($k)
s1 PR,NC PR,NC 4.0 3.9 6.2 266 419 390 540 3.8 1.5 2.0 0.0 2.4 0.1
s2 PR,NC PR,TR 4.0 3.9 6.2 266 419 390 540 3.8 1.5 2.0 0.0 2.4 0.1
s3 PR,NC PR,CB 4.1 4.0 6.5 187 405 312 512 4.0 1.6 2.0 0.0 6.1 0.2
s4 PR,NC SEL,NC 4.0 3.9 6.1 295 388 415 515 4.0 1.4 1.9 0.0 2.9 0.2
s5 PR,NC SEL,TR 4.0 3.9 6.1 295 388 415 515 4.0 1.4 1.9 0.0 2.9 0.2
s6 PR,NC SEL,CB 4.1 4.0 6.5 187 405 312 512 4.0 1.6 2.0 0.0 6.1 0.2
s7 PR,TR PR,NC 4.0 3.9 6.0 295 381 416 508 4.1 1.4 1.9 0.0 2.7 0.2
s8 PR,TR PR,TR 4.0 3.9 6.1 384 284 506 407 4.0 1.4 2.2 0.0 2.1 0.2
s9 PR,TR PR,CB 4.1 4.0 6.3 206 404 335 515 3.6 1.5 1.7 0.1 5.2 0.3
s10 PR,TR SEL,NC 4.0 3.9 5.9 303 373 421 502 4.1 1.4 1.7 0.0 3.2 0.2
s11 PR,TR SEL,TR 4.0 3.9 6.2 387 273 506 403 4.2 1.2 2.0 0.0 3.2 0.3
s12 PR,TR SEL,CB 4.1 3.9 6.1 219 395 347 505 3.6 1.5 2.2 0.0 6.1 0.3
s13 PR,CB PR,NC 4.0 3.9 6.1 379 293 500 421 4.1 1.3 2.3 0.0 2.6 0.2
s14 PR,CB PR,TR 4.0 3.9 5.9 331 365 455 482 3.8 1.4 2.3 0.0 2.3 0.2
s15 PR,CB PR,CB 4.0 3.9 6.2 185 433 320 503 3.0 2.2 1.1 0.1 6.7 0.4
s16 PR,CB SEL,NC 4.0 3.9 6.2 353 311 472 440 4.4 1.3 1.9 0.0 3.7 0.2
s17 PR,CB SEL,TR 4.0 3.9 5.8 320 356 439 479 4.1 1.3 1.9 0.0 3.4 0.3
s18 PR,CB SEL,CB 4.0 3.9 6.0 185 436 316 509 3.1 2.2 1.1 0.0 7.5 0.5
s19 SEL,NC PR,NC 4.1 3.9 5.0 -85 863 59 963 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.3 2.1 0.0
s20 SEL,NC PR,TR 4.1 3.9 5.0 -85 863 59 963 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.3 2.1 0.0
s21 SEL,NC PR,CB 4.1 3.9 5.0 -127 835 31 945 2.0 1.6 3.0 0.3 5.0 0.1
s22 SEL,NC SEL,NC 4.1 3.9 5.0 -85 863 59 963 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.3 2.1 0.0
s23 SEL,NC SEL,TR 4.1 3.9 5.0 -85 863 59 963 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.3 2.1 0.0
s24 SEL,NC SEL,CB 4.1 3.9 5.0 -127 835 31 945 2.0 1.6 3.0 0.3 5.0 0.1
s25 SEL,TR PR,NC 4.0 3.9 5.0 -11 784 125 884 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 2.5 0.1
s26 SEL,TR PR,TR 4.0 3.9 5.0 29 742 163 845 2.9 1.9 1.1 0.0 2.3 0.1
s27 SEL,TR PR,CB 4.0 3.9 5.0 58 623 199 711 2.8 2.0 1.6 0.0 5.3 0.3
s28 SEL,TR SEL,NC 4.0 3.9 5.0 -11 784 125 884 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 2.5 0.1
s29 SEL,TR SEL,TR 4.0 3.9 5.0 20 751 155 853 3.0 1.9 1.0 0.0 2.6 0.1
s30 SEL,TR SEL,CB 4.0 3.9 5.0 58 621 192 712 3.0 2.0 1.7 0.0 6.0 0.4
s31 SEL,CB PR,NC 4.0 3.9 5.0 1 770 126 870 3.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 3.6 0.1
s32 SEL,CB PR,TR 4.0 3.9 5.1 66 705 196 809 2.8 1.8 2.3 0.1 2.8 0.2
s33 SEL,CB PR,CB 4.0 3.9 5.1 92 578 228 652 2.6 2.1 1.6 0.1 5.7 0.4
s34 SEL,CB SEL,NC 4.0 3.9 5.0 1 770 126 870 3.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 3.6 0.1
s35 SEL,CB SEL,TR 4.0 3.9 5.0 56 717 183 821 2.8 1.9 2.4 0.1 3.6 0.2
s36 SEL,CB SEL,CB 4.0 3.9 5.0 91 588 227 666 2.6 1.8 2.0 0.1 6.5 0.4
Table 3: Deviation-1 (P2P)
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sc STP LTP wPL uPL diam- profit profit profit profit num num num Traf %PP Traf
str str eter all STP all LTP fit STP fit LTP fit STP fit LTP UA UA PP
($k) ($k) ($k) ($k)
s1 PR,NC PR,NC 3.3 3.5 6.0 -154 1537 13 1656 0.8 1.6 4.2 0.1 2.7 0.0
s2 PR,NC PR,TR 3.3 3.5 6.0 -154 1537 13 1656 0.8 1.6 4.2 0.1 2.7 0.0
s3 PR,NC PR,CB 3.4 3.5 6.5 -204 1512 4 1620 0.4 1.6 5.3 0.2 5.2 0.1
s4 PR,NC SEL,NC 3.3 3.5 6.0 -154 1537 13 1656 0.8 1.6 4.2 0.1 2.7 0.0
s5 PR,NC SEL,TR 3.3 3.5 6.0 -154 1537 13 1656 0.8 1.6 4.2 0.1 2.7 0.0
s6 PR,NC SEL,CB 3.4 3.5 6.5 -204 1512 4 1620 0.4 1.6 5.3 0.2 5.2 0.1
s7 PR,TR PR,NC 3.3 3.4 5.8 -152 1498 8 1618 0.8 1.5 4.1 0.1 2.8 0.0
s8 PR,TR PR,TR 3.3 3.4 6.0 -132 1455 24 1583 0.9 1.4 4.0 0.1 2.4 0.0
s9 PR,TR PR,CB 3.3 3.4 6.2 -154 1469 28 1589 0.8 1.4 4.2 0.1 3.9 0.1
s10 PR,TR SEL,NC 3.3 3.4 5.8 -152 1498 8 1618 0.8 1.5 4.1 0.1 2.8 0.0
s11 PR,TR SEL,TR 3.3 3.4 5.9 -132 1456 24 1584 0.9 1.4 3.9 0.1 2.9 0.0
s12 PR,TR SEL,CB 3.3 3.4 6.3 -154 1468 28 1587 0.9 1.5 4.0 0.1 4.6 0.1
s13 PR,CB PR,NC 3.3 3.4 5.9 -165 1512 2 1633 0.5 1.4 4.6 0.1 4.3 0.0
s14 PR,CB PR,TR 3.3 3.4 6.1 -149 1535 19 1653 0.5 1.6 4.2 0.1 3.6 0.1
s15 PR,CB PR,CB 3.3 3.4 6.0 -175 1475 18 1586 0.4 1.6 4.0 0.2 5.0 0.1
s16 PR,CB SEL,NC 3.3 3.4 5.9 -165 1512 2 1633 0.5 1.4 4.6 0.1 4.3 0.0
s17 PR,CB SEL,TR 3.3 3.4 6.1 -143 1526 23 1646 0.7 1.5 4.4 0.1 4.2 0.1
s18 PR,CB SEL,CB 3.3 3.4 6.1 -174 1474 18 1585 0.5 1.6 4.1 0.2 5.6 0.1
s19 SEL,NC PR,NC 3.2 3.3 5.0 -183 1519 0 1620 0.0 2.0 3.0 0.2 2.1 0.0
s20 SEL,NC PR,TR 3.2 3.3 5.0 -183 1519 0 1620 0.0 2.0 3.0 0.2 2.1 0.0
s21 SEL,NC PR,CB 3.2 3.3 5.0 -193 1517 0 1617 0.0 2.0 4.0 0.2 2.9 0.0
s22 SEL,NC SEL,NC 3.2 3.3 5.0 -183 1519 0 1620 0.0 2.0 3.0 0.2 2.1 0.0
s23 SEL,NC SEL,TR 3.2 3.3 5.0 -183 1519 0 1620 0.0 2.0 3.0 0.2 2.1 0.0
s24 SEL,NC SEL,CB 3.2 3.3 5.0 -193 1517 0 1617 0.0 2.0 4.0 0.2 2.9 0.0
s25 SEL,TR PR,NC 3.2 3.3 5.0 -180 1514 0 1615 0.0 2.0 3.0 0.2 2.5 0.0
s26 SEL,TR PR,TR 3.2 3.3 5.0 -178 1511 1 1611 0.1 2.0 2.9 0.2 2.4 0.0
s27 SEL,TR PR,CB 3.2 3.3 5.0 -192 1510 0 1610 0.0 2.0 4.0 0.2 3.4 0.0
s28 SEL,TR SEL,NC 3.2 3.3 5.0 -180 1514 0 1615 0.0 2.0 3.0 0.2 2.5 0.0
s29 SEL,TR SEL,TR 3.2 3.3 5.0 -178 1512 1 1612 0.1 2.0 2.9 0.2 2.6 0.0
s30 SEL,TR SEL,CB 3.2 3.3 5.0 -192 1510 0 1610 0.0 2.0 4.0 0.2 3.4 0.0
s31 SEL,CB PR,NC 3.2 3.3 5.0 -192 1514 0 1615 0.0 2.0 3.0 0.2 3.8 0.0
s32 SEL,CB PR,TR 3.2 3.3 5.0 -186 1500 3 1600 0.2 2.0 2.8 0.2 3.7 0.0
s33 SEL,CB PR,CB 3.2 3.3 5.0 -198 1496 1 1593 0.1 2.0 3.6 0.2 4.4 0.0
s34 SEL,CB SEL,NC 3.2 3.3 5.0 -192 1514 0 1615 0.0 2.0 3.0 0.2 3.8 0.0
s35 SEL,CB SEL,TR 3.2 3.3 5.0 -180 1491 6 1599 0.3 1.9 2.7 0.2 3.9 0.0
s36 SEL,CB SEL,CB 3.2 3.3 5.0 -197 1495 1 1593 0.1 2.0 3.7 0.2 4.5 0.0
Table 4: Deviation-2 (EP)
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sc STP LTP wPL uPL diam- profit profit profit profit num num num Traf %PP Traf
str str eter all STP all LTP fit STP fit LTP fit STP fit LTP UA UA PP
($k) ($k) ($k) ($k)
s1 PR,NC PR,NC 3.7 3.9 6.2 450 207 570 334 4.0 1.4 0.7 0.0 2.4 0.1
s2 PR,NC PR,TR 3.7 3.9 6.2 450 207 570 334 4.0 1.4 0.7 0.0 2.4 0.1
s3 PR,NC PR,CB 4.2 4.0 6.3 17 393 149 493 3.6 2.0 1.4 0.2 6.6 0.5
s4 PR,NC SEL,NC 3.7 3.9 6.2 464 190 583 324 4.2 1.2 0.8 0.0 2.7 0.1
s5 PR,NC SEL,TR 3.7 3.9 6.2 464 190 583 324 4.2 1.2 0.8 0.0 2.7 0.1
s6 PR,NC SEL,CB 4.2 4.0 6.3 17 393 149 493 3.6 2.0 1.4 0.2 6.6 0.5
s7 PR,TR PR,NC 3.7 3.9 6.4 512 132 630 264 4.3 1.3 0.8 0.0 2.4 0.1
s8 PR,TR PR,TR 3.7 3.9 6.1 515 152 637 290 4.0 1.2 1.3 0.0 2.1 0.2
s9 PR,TR PR,CB 4.0 3.9 6.2 92 406 236 499 2.7 2.0 1.9 0.2 6.4 0.4
s10 PR,TR SEL,NC 3.7 3.9 6.4 528 113 645 252 4.5 1.1 1.0 0.0 2.9 0.2
s11 PR,TR SEL,TR 3.7 3.9 6.1 527 117 645 259 4.2 1.0 1.4 0.0 3.0 0.2
s12 PR,TR SEL,CB 4.1 3.9 6.0 53 387 184 489 3.2 2.0 1.3 0.2 6.8 0.5
s13 PR,CB PR,NC 3.8 3.9 6.1 360 196 483 322 4.0 1.4 1.0 0.0 5.2 0.3
s14 PR,CB PR,TR 3.8 3.9 6.1 354 229 484 356 3.7 1.3 1.0 0.1 5.2 0.3
s15 PR,CB PR,CB 3.9 3.9 5.9 89 347 229 419 2.3 2.2 1.6 0.2 7.9 0.6
s16 PR,CB SEL,NC 3.7 3.9 6.2 398 183 518 314 4.1 1.3 1.0 0.0 5.8 0.3
s17 PR,CB SEL,TR 3.8 3.9 6.1 392 181 514 315 4.0 1.2 0.8 0.0 5.8 0.3
s18 PR,CB SEL,CB 3.9 3.9 5.9 84 358 220 439 2.5 1.9 1.8 0.1 8.3 0.6
s19 SEL,NC PR,NC 3.8 3.9 5.0 123 595 257 696 2.4 1.6 1.0 0.1 2.1 0.0
s20 SEL,NC PR,TR 3.8 3.9 5.0 123 595 257 696 2.4 1.6 1.0 0.1 2.1 0.0
s21 SEL,NC PR,CB 3.9 3.9 5.0 -152 662 13 761 1.3 1.8 2.2 0.4 6.0 0.5
s22 SEL,NC SEL,NC 3.8 3.9 5.0 123 595 257 696 2.4 1.6 1.0 0.1 2.1 0.0
s23 SEL,NC SEL,TR 3.8 3.9 5.0 123 595 257 696 2.4 1.6 1.0 0.1 2.1 0.0
s24 SEL,NC SEL,CB 4.0 3.9 5.0 -165 693 2 793 1.0 2.0 2.0 0.5 5.8 0.4
s25 SEL,TR PR,NC 3.8 3.9 5.0 123 595 257 696 2.4 1.6 1.0 0.1 2.1 0.0
s26 SEL,TR PR,TR 3.8 3.9 5.0 139 588 273 688 2.6 1.4 1.1 0.1 2.1 0.0
s27 SEL,TR PR,CB 3.9 3.9 5.0 -27 578 141 678 1.5 1.8 2.1 0.4 5.5 0.5
s28 SEL,TR SEL,NC 3.8 3.9 5.0 123 595 257 696 2.4 1.6 1.0 0.1 2.1 0.0
s29 SEL,TR SEL,TR 3.8 3.9 5.0 137 590 270 692 2.6 1.4 1.0 0.1 2.2 0.0
s30 SEL,TR SEL,CB 3.9 3.9 5.0 -35 588 124 690 1.5 1.9 1.7 0.4 6.3 0.5
s31 SEL,CB PR,NC 3.7 3.8 5.0 235 478 365 579 3.0 1.6 0.4 0.0 2.5 0.1
s32 SEL,CB PR,TR 3.7 3.9 5.0 247 467 378 568 2.9 1.5 0.7 0.0 2.6 0.1
s33 SEL,CB PR,CB 3.8 3.9 5.0 28 484 187 575 2.1 1.8 2.2 0.2 5.8 0.5
s34 SEL,CB SEL,NC 3.7 3.8 5.0 235 478 365 579 3.0 1.6 0.4 0.0 2.5 0.1
s35 SEL,CB SEL,TR 3.7 3.9 5.0 246 469 377 571 2.9 1.5 0.6 0.0 2.5 0.1
s36 SEL,CB SEL,CB 3.8 3.9 5.0 11 498 163 586 2.2 1.8 1.9 0.2 6.8 0.5
Table 5: Deviation-3 (GEO)
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